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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
felt money,75 receiving stolen property, 76 and obtaining goods by false pre-
tenses.77 In all of these cases the defendant's acts alone do not prove his
intent, and evidence of similar and/or related acts is admitted to show intent.
The Cohen case seems to fall within this exception to the general rule. Proof
of arson by the defendant in the Pennsylvania fire indicates the falseness of his
representations as to the cause of the fire and, in addition, tends to show his
intent to defraud the insurer by obtaining the insurance proceeds by means of
false representations.
CIRcUMsTANTIAL EVIDENCE OF OPERATION OF MOTOR VEHICLE
The Westchester County Court reversed a Special Sessions conviction
under Section 70(5) of the New York Vehicle and Traffic Law, for operating
a motor vehicle while intoxicated.7 8 The ground of the County Court's reversal
was that the people had failed to establish that the defendant was operating
the vehicle within the meaning of the section. In People v. Blake79 the Court
of Appeals reversed this determination and ordered a new trial.
Defendant was found by police officers, seated alone, in a drunken condi-
tion, in his automobile which was halted against a guardrail on the Bronx River
Parkway, with the engine running. On appeal defendant argued that the facts
surrounding his apprehension were not sufficient to show that he was operating
the auto as charged. On the other hand, the people argued that the defendant
was in fact operating when he was taken into custody. The question appears
to be on open one in the Court of Appeals, the only New York decision estab-
lishing a standard for "operating" being handed down by the County Court
of Erie County.80 It was there indicated that one must be making some effort
toward putting the car into operation and motion.
The Court of Appeals avoided the question in the instant case, however,
by holding there was sufficient circumstantial evidence to find the defendant
"had" operated. Under the tests as established in People v. Taddio81 and
People v. Weiss,82 the Court held that the facts adduced at trial supported a
clear inference that defendant had operated the vehicle, despite the possibility
that someone else may have been operating. In reaching this decision, the
Court makes it clear that "had been operating" is included within the "operat-
ing" of the Section herein involved, and that that operation may be shown by
circumstantial evidence under established principles.
Although the question of what constitutes operating in the sense of "is
operating" is left open in the Court of Appeals, the burden in enforcing this
75. People v. Everhardt, 104 N.Y. 591, 11 N.E. 62 (1887).
76. Coleman v. People, 58 N.Y. 555 (1874).
77. Mayer v. People, 80 N.Y. 364 (1880).
78. "Whoever operates a motor vehicle or motor cycle while in an intoxicated
condition shall be guilty of a misdemeanor."
79. 5 N.Y.2d 118, 180 N.Y.S.2d 775 (1958).
80. People v. Domagala, 123 Misc. 757, 206 N.Y. Supp. 288 (1924).
81. People v. Taddio, 292 N.Y. 488, 55 N.E.2d 749 (1944).
82. People v. Weiss, 290 N.Y. 160, 48 N.E.2d 306 (1943).
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section of the Vehicle and Traffic Law appears to be eased by the instant
decision. The officers may now charge defendant directly on information,
relying upon facts within their knowledge to show "operation" circumstan-
tially, without having to procure another affiant to support a charge upon
information and belief.
EVIDENCE OF SPEEDING PROVIDED BY UNTESTED RADAR EQUIPMENT SUFFICIENT
IF CORROBORATED BY QUALIFIED OBSERVERS
Defendant's conviction in the City Court of Buffalo for speeding was
based on a radar meter reading, supported by the observations of two police-
men. One officer, looking through the rear view mirror of the radar car, ob-
served defendant's car for about 150 feet as it approached the field of the
radar beam. The other officer was stationed about one-tenth of a mile further
down the street. He watched defendant's vehicle as it passed the radar car
and approached him head on, until it stopped just short of his position.
The grounds of defendant's appeal were that (1) the evidence of the
radar meter reading was insufficient because there was no evidence to show
that the speedometer, against which the radar set had been tested, was itself
accurate and (2) the testimony of the policemen was insufficient because
neither of them had an adequate opportunity to observe the speed of the
defendant's car. On appeal the Supreme Court, Erie County, rejected both
the policemen's testimony and the radar reading as insufficient and reversed
the conviction without specifying whether its decision was on the law or on
the facts.
The Court of Appeals, considering the Supreme Court reversal as one on
the law alone,8 3 held that evidence of speeding provided by untested measur-
ing devices was admissable but insufficient, without more, to sustain a con-
viction, and that testimony of qualified observers could supply the deficiency
in proof. The testimony of the police officers was also held to be admissable
and sufficient to raise a question of fact as to defendant's speed. The case
was remitted to the appellate court for determination of that question.8 4
The Court declared this holding to be based squarely upon its recent
decisions in a radar meter case, People v. Magri,8 5 and two speedometer cases,
People v. Heyser"6 and People v. Marsellus.87 In all three cases convictions
based on police officers' estimates of defendant's speed which corroborated the
readings of untested devices were upheld. In Magri', one officer located at
the radar car and another about 800 to 1000 feet further down the road
observed defendant as he approached the radar car, passed through the radar
beam and continued down the road to the second officer's position. In
83. N.Y. CODE CPn,1. PRoC. § 543-a(4).
84. People v. Dusing, 5 N.Y.2d 126, 181 N.Y.S.2d 493 (1959).
85. 3 N.Y.2d 562, 170 N.Y.S.2d 335 (1958).
86. 2 N.Y.2d 390, 161 N.Y.S.2d 36 (1957).
87. 2 N.Y.2d 653, 163 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1957).
88. People v. Magri, supra note 85.
